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Notes & Comments
Fixing Payday Lending:
The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement
I. INTRODUCTION
Sandra Harris is an average American.' When unforeseen
financial difficulties struck her family, she turned to payday lenders for
relief.2 Although this worked at first, Sandra soon found herself living
paycheck to paycheck, just trying to pay off the loan fees. Eventually,
Sandra began to bounce checks and her car was repossessed. She was
forced to reduce her income tax withholding to increase her take home
pay, but this led to thousands of dollars in tax liability and eventually
wage garnishment.' Only through the help of her credit union and her
family has Ms. Harris been able to begin her climb out of the "debt
trap ' 6 caused by payday lending.7
Sandra's story is not unique; critics of payday lending often cite
similar examples.8 Such negative publicity has caused widespread
1. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE VICTIMS OF PAYDAY LENDING-
KEEPING UP: SANDRA HARRIS' STORY, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday/victims-
2.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal)
[hereinafter SANDRA HARRIS STORY].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See generally id.
6. Within the context of this Note, "debt trap" refers to the situation where a consumer
falls into debt and is unable to pay down the principal of the debt. The borrower is stuck in
a cycle of paying interest or finance charges that will end only as a result of outside help or
bankruptcy.
7. See SANDRA HARRIS STORY, supra note 1.
8. E.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Charles A. Brusch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday
Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by
Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2001); Lisa Blaylock Moss, Comment,
Modem Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions and the Need for
Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1729 (2000); Thomas A. Wilson, Comment, The
Availability of Statutory Damages Under TILA to Remedy the Sharp Practice of Payday
Lenders, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 339 (2003); see also CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, THE VICTIMS OF PAYDAY LENDING, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
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disapproval of the payday lending industry. 9 Indeed, some techniques
used by payday lenders such as repeated rollover,' ° high interest rates
(often exceeding 200% Annual Percentage Rate (APR))," and the threat
of criminal prosecution upon default 12 may justify this disapproval.
This Note addresses whether these practices are necessary
characteristics of the payday lending market, and argues that the
objectionable qualities of the subprime credit market exist because of
the current dynamics of this market.' 3 The payday lending market is
currently functioning at an equilibrium that is harmful to consumers,
where payday lenders are collecting economic rent. 14  This Note
suggests that the entry of banks into the payday lending market could
solve this problem by enhancing the competitive market forces within
the industry, which would shift the market to a new equilibrium and
extinguish economic rent.15 Also, there is evidence that suggests that
banks could benefit from the huge profits that the payday lending
industry has been reaping, 16 while reaching consumers that they have
payday/victims.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004) [hereinafter CFRL].
9. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 149 (2004);
Johnson, supra note 8, at 2; Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807,
902-03 (2003); see also Brusch, supra note 8, at 1257; Moss, supra note 8, at 1729; see
generally Daniel A. Edelman, Payday Loans: Big Interest Rates and Little Regulation, 11
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 174, 175 (1999) (arguing that payday loans have interest rates that
are not cost justified and that payday lenders violate the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)). For
disapproval of payday lending by Consumer Groups, see JEAN ANNE Fox, UNSAFE AND
UNSOUND: PAYDAY LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY
(March 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdlrentabankreport.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2004) (voicing the disapproval of the Consumer Federation of America);
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING WEBPAGE at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
payday/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
10. Rollover refers to when a loan is refinanced when the term of the loan comes due.
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 2-3. Repeated rollover is when a loan is rolled over many
times and this can be predatory when the high interest rates over longer periods push a
debtor into an inescapable cycle of debt. See id.
11. Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is a way of calculating the interest rate on a loan.
See Definition of APR at http://www.goodmortage.com/mortgageschool/MSAPR.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2005). APR refers to the amount of interest that would have to be paid on the
principal of a loan if the term of the loan extended for one year. See id.
12. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 26.
13. See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 78-97 (explaining the economic terms used in
this article); infra text accompanying notes 94-118 (explaining the dynamics of the payday
lending market).
15. See infra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 162-204 and accompanying text.
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not been serving as effectively.' 7
Section II of this note explains the characteristics of payday
loans and the payday lending market. 18 Section III analyzes the payday
lending market using the tools of law and economics and argues that
payday lenders are earning economic rent.' 9 Section IV analyzes the
failed attempts at regulating the payday lending market.2z Section V
proposes and evaluates a new solution to fixing the payday lending
market: greater bank involvement.
21
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PAYDAY LENDING MARKET
A. Characteristics of the Payday Loan
Payday loans are short term, high interest rate, consumer
loans. 22 In the basic payday loan transaction, the borrower writes a
postdated or undated check to the lender, with the understanding that
the check will not be deposited until the borrower's next payday
(usually two weeks away).23 The lender then pays the borrower the face
value of the check minus the payday loan fee, which is usually around
$15 for every $100 loaned 24 (an APR of 390% if the loan term is two
weeks),25 but which can be higher.26
The borrower has several options for paying off the payday
loan.27 The borrower may either allow the check given to the payday
lender to be cashed, or, alternatively, he can pay the lender that same
amount in advance of the due date.28 However, if the borrower cannot
afford to pay off the loan at the end of the loan period, the borrower can
"roll over" the loan by paying the lender an additional fee, extending it
17. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22-77 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 78-118 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 119-151 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 152-227 and accompanying text.
22. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 2.
23. See Scott Andrew Schaaf, Comment, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the
Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 341-42 (2001).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 342.
26. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 31; Moss, supra note 8, at 1729.
27. See Schaaf, supra note 23, at 342.
28. See id.
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another two weeks.29
B. How Payday Loans Exist in the Credit Market
The payday lending industry has grown tremendously in the
short time since its inception in the early 1990s. 30 By 2000, more than
10,000 payday lenders operated in the U.S. 3 Payday lenders make
around "sixty-five million loans to between eight and ten million
households" a year, with total loan value exceeding $10 billion.32 Part
of the reason for this growth is the profitability of this industry (the
industry brings in revenue of over $2 billion a year).33 Payday lenders
average returns on capital of 24% or more.34 A majority of these profits
is derived from rollover fees,35 as most payday borrowers roll over their
loans frequently.36
29. See id.
30. See Barr, supra note 9, at 149 (noting in addition that "the short-term lending
function has long been filled by pawnshops, auto title lenders, retail installment credit, and
loan sharks, to name a few").
31. See id.
32. See id. at 150.
33. See id. at 149-50.
34. See id. ("The industry reports gross margins of 30%-45% of revenue, with losses at
1%-1.3% of receivables and return on investment of 24%"); see also Daniel A. Edelman,
Regarding Payday and Title Loans, at http://www.edcombs.com/CM/News/news20.asp
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (citing studies that showed payday lender returns on capital at
30% and 40% which is about 3 times the returns that banks are making) [hereinafter
Regarding Payday Loans]; Brendan Koerner, Preying on Payday, at
http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2001/05/payday.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2004) (citing a return on equity of 35%); TRIHOUSE ENTERPRISES INC., INDUSTRY OVERVIEW,
at http://www.paydayandpaycheckloans.com/payday-loan-industry.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2004) (citing a return on capital of 30%).
35. See Barr, supra note 9, at 157. This means that the majority of payday lender's
gross income comes from payday loans that are renewed. Id. The fact that payday lenders
make the majority of their income on payday loans that are renewed is a reflection of the
statistics that show that the majority of payday loan fees come from the renewal of a
preexistent loan rather than from new customers taking out new loans. See id. at 157.
In North Carolina in 2000, 40% of all payday loan revenues were
generated by the 18% of customers who took out an average of at least
one loan per month. Each 1% increase in the share of customers who
borrow at least monthly from the company increased the outlet's bottom
line by $790.
See id.
36. See Barr, supra note 9, at 156.
A study of payday borrowers in Illinois found that the median borrower
had more than ten loan contracts over a two-year period, and that one-
fifth of borrowers had twenty or more contracts in that time. In
136 [Vol. 9
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The population that uses payday loans tends to be low to
moderate earners with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000. 37
Payday borrowers tend to be credit constrained in some way and thus
lack access to more traditional forms of credit. 38  The majority of
customers use payday loans to pay for unanticipated emergency costs,
such as car repairs or medical bills.39
Payday loans are appealing to consumers for two primary
reasons.4° First, payday borrowers often perceive that they have no
other credit options.41 This perception can be incorrect; in fact there is
evidence that many subprime borrowers could qualify for prime credit.42
Second, payday loans can be obtained with great ease and speed.43 A
payday loan can usually be obtained in under twenty minutes 44 with
little or no credit check,45 these being typically limited to checking for
other outstanding payday loans.4 6 All a borrower needs to have to get a
payday loan is "a checking account, a steady job, and no history of
Wisconsin, 56% of payday borrowers took out at least eleven loans in
one twelve-month period. In Indiana, 77% of all payday transactions
were rollovers, and the average annual number of loan renewals was
ten. In North Carolina, the typical payday loan customer took out seven
loans in one year from one lender. The CFSA study found that three-
quarters of payday borrowers rolled over their loan at least once, and
that 30% had seven or more rollovers. Using the Wisconsin statistic as
an example, the typical payday loan consumer, who takes out eleven
two-week payday loans per year, for the average loan amount of $300,
at the average 470% APR from the Consumer Federation of America
(CFA) survey, spends nearly $600 annually in fees.
See id. See also Edelman, supra note 9, at 174; Brusch, supra note 8, at 1272; Schaaf, supra
note 23, at 346.
37. See Barr, supra note 9, at 153.
38. See id. See, e.g., Johnson supra note 8, at 11 (stating that the reasons for being
credit constrained range from lacking a home and thus lacking an equity line of credit to
having a damaged credit history possibly declaring bankruptcy and having little or no
savings).
39. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 103.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
41. See e.g. Schaaf, supra note 23, at 344.
42. See Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447, 457 (2002).
43. See Schaaf, supra note 23, at 344.
44. See Barr, supra note 9, at 151.
45. See Edelman, supra note 9, at 174; Schaaf, supra note 23, at 343.
46. See Barr, supra note 9, at 151 (explaining that Tele-Trak is used by payday lenders
to track the number of subprime loans outstanding).
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writing bad checks. 47
C. Payday Lending and the Debt Trap
Payday lending pushes consumers into a debt trap for several
reasons. 48 First, rollover is inevitable for most payday loan users, given
the short, two week term of most payday loans.49 Most payday
borrowers only have a small surplus of cash in any given week, and thus
are rarely able to repay the loan within the two week term while still
paying for necessary expenses.5 °
Another factor that increases consumer susceptibility to the debt
trap is the lending practices of many payday lenders.5 ' A recent survey
of payday lenders in Ohio revealed that payday lenders are quite willing
to allow individuals to obtain multiple loans simultaneously without any
determination of the individual's ability to repay the loans, 52 a practice
commonly associated with predatory lending.53 Since the majority of
payday lenders use the Tele-Track service, they know when consumers
have multiple outstanding loans, 54 and yet the study revealed that it was
47. See Schaaf, supra note 23, at 343.
48. See infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
49. See Brusch, supra note 8, at 1280-81.
50. See Brusch, supra note 8, at 1280.
One study analyzed the '[a]bility to [riepay' of borrowers earning
$25,000 a year and borrowers earning $35,000 a year. This study
concluded that a person making $25,000 a year would, without
payments on a payday loan, fall $14 a week short on recurring payments
for food, housing, healthcare, transportation, and utilities, and a person
making $35,000 would have a weekly surplus of $67. These figures do
not include emergency payments for car repairs or medical treatment,
which points to the second major factor contributing to the high default
rate of payday loans; the two-week duration of most payday loans does
not give borrowers a chance to recover from the problem that sent them
to the payday lender in the first place. As previously illustrated,
borrowers start out with an extremely small surplus. To give them only
two weeks to accumulate enough money to pay off a loan, and to leave
them with nothing to pay for emergencies that may arise during the life
of the loan, is an untenable proposition.
Id.
51. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 26.
52. See id. at 63.
53. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICES ACTIVITIES 465 (2nd ed. 2004).
54. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 61. Tele-Track is a subprime credit reporting service.
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possible to obtain multiple loans from the same payday lender quite
easily.55 Given that consumers often have difficulty paying off a single
payday loan in two weeks, it is clear that many will be unable to pay off
multiple payday loans in the same time period.56
The disclosure practices of payday lenders also play a role.57
Payday lenders erect barriers to price shopping, enabling them to charge
higher prices.58  For example, many payday lenders hide basic
information about payday loans from consumers.5 9 The Ohio survey
showed that a majority of the payday lenders refused to let consumers
take the loan contract home to examine it prior to the loan or to let the
consumer have a copy of the contract after the loan was made.60 A few
of the payday lenders even claimed that it was against the law to take
the contract out of the store.61 Payday lenders often gave false or
misleading information about payday loans, or failed to give the interest
rate in terms of APR62 as required by federal law.63 One payday lender,
when asked, even denied that the interest rate of a payday loan could be
measured as an APR.64 Other payday lenders also failed to state the
interest rate of payday loans as an APR in advertisements for payday
loans even though this is also required by federal law.65
Another way that payday lenders prevent price shopping is by
delaying disclosure of loan terms. 66  Since payday lenders are not
required to release information such as the interest rate or finance
charges until immediately before the consummation of the loan
contract,67 payday lenders can use this delay tactic to raise the cost of
price shopping. Payday lenders often confirm the borrower's
55. See id. at 63.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 890.
58. See id.
59. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 32.
60. See id. at 35-36.
61. See id. at 36.
62. See id. at 38.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1606.
64. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 38-39.
65. See id. at 40. 84% of payday lenders failed to cite the APR of their loans in
advertisements as specifically required by the Truth in Lending Act. Id.
66. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 898.
67. See id.
20051
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employment with a phone call to the borrower's place of employment.68
If lenders make such calls before disclosure of payment terms, as is the
common practice, this can end a borrower's attempt at price shopping
immediately lest the borrower risk the potential embarrassment and
employment risk that a bombardment of confirmation calls by multiple
payday lenders would pose. 69  Also, by delaying disclosure of loan
terms, payday lenders force borrowers to invest more time and effort in
obtaining loan information, which makes price shopping more
difficult.7° These tactics create serious barriers to price shopping and
often result in borrowers failing to extend their price searches beyond
one or two lenders.7'
Payday lenders have debt collection options that most debt
collectors lack.72 When a borrower defaults, the payday lender can use
civil and criminal remedies available under bad check statutes. 73 For
instance, in Ohio, payday lenders used the bad check statute to threaten
suit for treble damages and sometimes even wage garnishment.74
Further, the threat of criminal prosecution under bad check statutes is
also a very effective debt collection practice.75
The debt trap resulting from the disclosure practices, the price
shopping barriers, and the collection resources of payday lenders is the
basis of the disapproval of payday lending by consumer protection
groups.76 These practices suggest that payday loans are probably not
optimally serving the needs of the subprime borrower.77
III. PAYDAY LENDING AND ECONOMIC RENT
To analyze the payday lending market, this Note uses the tools
68. See id. at 895.
69. See id. at 896.
70. See id. at 898.
71. See id. at 894.
72. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589,610 (2000).
73. See id.; Brusch, supra note 8, at 1281-82.
74. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 78.
75. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 86; see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 72; Brusch,
supra note 8, at 1281-82.
76. See CFRL, supra note 8; Fox, supra note 9.
77. See supra notes 30-75 and accompanying text.
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of law and economics. A "perfect market" is characterized by several
qualities. First, it is assumed that in any given market, there are a large
number of sellers that offer substantially identical products.78 Second,
there are a large number of buyers that are perfectly informed of the of
the qualities of the good that they are buying, including the likelihood
that the good will malfunction, and also of the prices for this good
offered by all of the different sellers.79 Third, all actors in the market
are rational profit maximizers, that is, each actor attempts to maximize
his economic benefits and acts in a way that is rationally aimed towards
profit maximization. 80 Fourth, there are no barriers for sellers to enter
or exit the market.81 A market with these qualities, a "perfect market,"
will achieve a state known as perfect equilibrium, that is, the supply of
the good offered by sellers will equal the demand for the good, and the
price of the good will be stable because small fluctuations in demand
will be matched by similar responsive moves in supply through the
entrance to and exit from the market of sellers.82
The perfect market will have one additional attribute. The
return on capital for the seller in an efficient market for a particular
good will be identical to the return on capital in every other efficient
market once adjusted for risk. 83 This is because if the return on capital
in different product markets differs, sellers, being profit maximizers will
leave the market with the lower return on capital and enter the market
with the higher return on capital.84 The movement of sellers into and
out of a market causes the return on capital in both markets to
equalize.85 If the return on capital in one market is greater than the
return on capital in other markets, that difference is referred to as
economic rent and this means that either buyers are paying
disproportionately too much for a good or sellers are taking on
disproportionate risk.86 The implication is that a perfectly functioning
78. See Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 83 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
79. See id.
80. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11 (1994).
81. See KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 105 (Custom UNC
Chapel Hill ed. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
82. See id. at 194.
83. See id. at 108-109.
84. See generally id. at 48, 108-109, 143, 151.
85. See id. at 53.
86. See Fact Monster: Economic Rent, at http://www.factmonster.com/ipd/A0420744.
2005]
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market extinguishes economic rent because sellers are profit
maximizers (e.g. rent seekers) that maximize profits by price competing
with each other.
87
An imperfect market exists when one or more of the four
qualities of a perfect market are absent. In an imperfect market, the
price can be stable (in equilibrium) while at the same time, sellers are
earning economic rent.88 Thus, the normal workings of the perfect
market fail to extinguish economic rent in an imperfect market.89 One
common example of an imperfect market is a monopoly where there is
only one seller in the market.90 While in a perfect market sellers will
base the price of a good on the cost of production, 91 in a monopoly, the
seller will maximize profits by basing his prices on buyer need to a
greater degree.92 Thus, monopolists earn excess return on capital,
economic rent, and the consumer is worse off than if the market
functioned perfectly.93
Game theory predicts that a persistent imperfect market will
occur when there are certain factors that create an incentive for sellers to
engage in tacit price collusion and form an oligopoly. 94 There is an
incentive for collusion when long term collusion would lead to greater
profits than long term competition.95 A number of factors make this
incentive to tacitly collude more likely to control firm behavior. These
factors include the youth of the industry, the number of competitors in
the industry remaining small, the inability of buyers to price shop, easy
access to the price information of competitors, and the existence of
competition based on factors other than price.96 The more of these
factors that are present in a particular market, the more likely persistent
tacit price collusion will occur and sellers will earn economic rent.
97
The payday lending market exhibits many of these factors.
html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
87. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 48, 108-109, 143, 151.
88. See BAIRD, supra note 80, at 172.
89. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 199.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 134.
92. See id. at 215.
93. See id.
94. See BAIRD, supra note 80, at 165.
95. See id. at 172.
96. See id. at 172-175.
97. See id.
[Vol. 9
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First, this market is relatively young, being in existence since
only the early nineties.98 As a result, price competition has not had as
much of an opportunity to be established as a strategy of firms in the
market.99
Second, payday borrowers are not particularly sophisticated,
inhibiting their ability to price shop."°° Unsophisticated buyers will not
appreciate the true cost that they are paying for goods and thus they will
accept a higher price for the goods than if they had correct
information.1"" Thus, unsophisticated borrowers are less capable of the
price comparison necessary to make payday lenders price compete. 102
This allows payday lenders to charge a higher price than borrowers
would accept if they had perfect information and this allows payday
lenders to earn economic rent.'0 3
Third, payday lenders are engaged in activities that discourage
price shopping °4 and instead compete based on other factors such as
location of the store, flashy signs, promises of quick cash, and name
recognition.10 5  When payday lenders increase the cost of gathering
information, buyers cannot efficiently price shop. 10 6 When this is the
case no seller has an incentive to decrease his prices since no buyer will
be able to perceive the significance of this change, and thus payday
lenders will continue to charge higher prices and earn economic rent.1
0 7
Further, when there are barriers to entry into a market created
either by high start up costs, laws, or other factors, new firms may have
difficulty entering this market and may be dissuaded entirely, allowing
the imperfect market to exist persistently. 10 8 Large players like banks
have not entered the payday lending market to act as payday lenders
because of such barriers to entry.'0 9 First, banks may be prevented for
reputational reasons from engaging in payday lending since there is
98. See Schaaf, supra note 23, at 356.
99. See supra text accompanying note 96.
100. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 891-892.
101. See generally Craswell, supra note 78, at 88.
102. See supra text accompanying note 96.
103. See generally Craswell, supra note 78, at 88.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
105. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 896.
106. See generally Craswell, supra note,. at 89.
107. See generally id.
108. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 245.
109. See infra notes 110-1 13 and accompanying text.
20051
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potentially a stigma attached to lending at rent seeking interest rates to
unsophisticated customers." °  Second, the costs of servicing and
creating payday loans are significant and pose a significant barrier to
entry into the market."' Third, many banks do not have branches in the
areas primarily served by payday lenders and do not offer as convenient
hours."12 Thus, banks might have to open additional branches and offer
more extensive hours to reach payday borrowers. Fourth, because
payday lenders do not price compete, banks would have to compete
using the same tools as payday lenders to consistently earn the same
economic rent, and banks cannot easily or potentially soundly compete
based on location of the branch, flashy signs, promises of quick cash,
and name recognition.'!3
These factors suggest that payday lenders are earning economic
rent, and there is empirical evidence to support this contention.
Although payday lenders claim that the fees they charge are
proportional to the risk and costs of their loans, 1 4 critics of payday
lenders claim that the default rates of payday loans are no higher than
those of loans with much lower interest rates.' '5 Further, payday
lenders are earning at least 24% return on capital with triple digit
interest margins," 6 while banks are making closer to 15% return on
110. See generally FDIC, Guidelines for Payday Lending, at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/safety/payday/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
111. Ben Jackson, More Banks Pitching Alternatives to Payday Loans, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 22, 2004, at 1.
112. See Barr, supra note 9, at 182.
113. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 896.
114. See, e.g., Schaaf, supra note 23, at 349. There are higher transaction costs
associated with underwriting and servicing payday loans compared to other forms of credit.
See Barr, supra note 9, at 155 ("Payday loans, unlike credit cards, require lenders to interact
face-to-face with borrowers each time they originate a new payday loan. They need to
conduct more follow up with borrowers than other lenders, and must charge enough to cover
loan losses.") Also, these loans are perceived as riskier than more standard loans. See
FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTERS OF AMERICA, WHITE PAPER: THE CONSUMER'S CHOICE: THE
ROLE OF DEFERRED DEPOSIT SERVS. IN MEETING SHORT TERM FIN. NEEDS, available at
http://www.fisca.org/whitepaper.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER]. Contra CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FACT VERSUS FICTION: THE TRUTH
ABOUT PAYDAY INDUS. CLAIMS, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday/
factfiction.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) [hereinafter FACT VS. FICTION].
115. See FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 114. This claim is supported by the fact that
payday lenders have losses of only 1-1.3% of accounts receivable; See Barr, supra note 9, at
150. While Wachovia claimed a 1.35% loss of accounts receivable from December 30-June
30, 2004. WACHOVIA CORP., SECOND QUARTER 2004: MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND
ANALYSIS QUARTERLY FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 1 (2004) [hereinafter WACHOVIA REPORT].
116. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Interest margin refers to the
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capital with interest margins closer to 3%.117 This difference is
significant, especially in the credit market where the return on capital
for major players should be substantially similar due to the size and
sophistication of the players in the market.' 18 Thus, payday lenders are
earning economic rent.
IV. FAILED ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE PAYDAY LENDING
While legislatures have attempted to improve the payday
lending market for consumers, their efforts have largely failed.
Legislatures have attempted to regulate payday lenders with two
categories of laws: usury regulation and regulation of loan terms
disclosure. 119 This section will show that neither kind of regulation
effectively regulates the operation of payday lenders, 120 although
changes in the nature of either regulation might alter this verdict.
A. Usury Regulation
Usury regulation limits the maximum interest rate that can be
charged on a loan.' 2' Although there are usury regulations imposed by
statute at both the state and federal levels, 122 Federal usury regulation
does not effectively limit interest rates. 123 Indeed, Federal law enables
banks to circumvent state usury regulations, since banks are allowed to
charge the interest rate allowed in the state where the bank is located.
24
Thus, even though many states have regulations limiting interest rates,
the rates are not binding many lenders because of federal preemption. 
21
difference between the interest that the lender earns from loaning out money and the interest
that the lender pays from borrowing the money he loans out. See generally WACHOVIA
REPORT, supra note 115, at 1.
117. See Regarding Payday Loans, supra note 34. For instance, Wachovia reports a
return on equity of only 15.49%. WACHOVIA REPORT, supra note 115, at 1.
118. See generally supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
119. See generally Brusch, supra note 8, at 1259, 1274.
120. See infra notes 121-151 and accompanying text.
121. See Brusch, supra note 8, at 1259.
122. See id.
123. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2000) (state banks).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (granting federal preemption to national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d
(granting federal preemption to state banks).
125. See Brusch, supra note 8, at 1262. For instance, North Carolina law limits the
interest that could be charged on small consumer loans at 16%, N.C.G.S. § 24-1.1 (2000),
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Non-bank lenders such as payday lenders can take advantage of federal
preemption by partnering with an out-of-state bank that makes the
payday loan and then immediately sells it to the payday lender that is
located in the state with the restrictive usury laws. 126 This practice is
referred to as charter renting.
121
Charter renting to payday lenders is only practiced by Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulated state banks since all
other bank and savings association regulators have put a stop to charter
renting arrangements. 128 The FDIC has not followed suit however, and
thus FDIC regulated state banks may still charter rent.12 9 If the FDIC
does follow suit in the future and prohibit charter renting to payday
lenders, then state usury regulation would have the power to control
payday lending.1
30
Usury regulation may also become a more effective means of
regulating payday lenders in the wake of the recent Georgia case,
Bankwest v. Baker.131 In Bankwest v. Baker the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia upheld a Georgia law that defined
an in-state agent as the maker of a loan if it retained a predominant
economic interest in the loan. 32 The purpose of this law was to bring
charter renting payday lenders within the reach of Georgia usury
but banks can escape these limits by locating in a state that does not have similarly
restrictive usury laws. See Brusch, supra note 8, at 1262. For a more in depth examination
of preemption, exportation, and charter renting see Darrell L. Dreher & Deborah Freye,
Continuing Challenges to Interstate Lending by Depository Institutions, 57 Bus. LAW. 1297,
1297 (2002); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation
Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REv. 518, 622
(2004); James J. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REv. 445 (2000); Tasha L.
Winebarger, Comment, The Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partnerships with
Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 317 (2003); Elizabeth Willoughby, Recent
Development, Bankwest v. Baker: Is it a Mayday for Payday Lenders in Rent-a-Charter
Arrangements?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. (forthcoming April 2005).
126. See Barr, supra note 9, at 151.
127. See id.
128. See OCC ANN. REP. 17 (2003); Fox, supra note 9, at 17. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has prohibited National banks from charter renting; the Fed has
prohibited State banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from charter
renting; the Office of Thrift Supervision has prohibited savings associations from charter
renting. Id.
129. See Fox, supra note 9, at 14.
130. See id.
131. Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). See Willoughby,
supra note 125, at 21-22.
132. Bankwest, Inc., 324 F. Supp.2d at 1351.
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laws. 133 This state law, if upheld on appeal, would open the door for
states to be able to stop charter renting nationally. 34 Thus, there is the
possibility that either state law or FDIC regulatory action could make
state usury regulations binding on all payday lenders.
135
One danger posed by the use of usury law to regulate payday
lending is that the regulator could set the maximum allowable interest
rate below the perfect market interest rate which would drive all lenders
out of the market, and this would hurt consumers.136 However, if used
correctly, usury regulation could be used to extinguish the economic
rent that is arguably present in the current payday loan market, making
loan terms more favorable to consumers.' 37 The effectiveness of usury
limits for extinguishing rent is thus dependent on the ability of the
regulator to predict the non-rent interest rate. 138 On the other hand,
133. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (2004).
134. See Willoughby, supra note 125, at 21.
135. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text. In addition, if the FDIC did
prohibit charter renting, this would provide banks with an opportunity to enter the payday
lending market with no competitors since the payday lenders would be out of business. See
generally supra text accompanying note 130. Since banks do not charter rent, having
independent bank charters themselves, they would still be able to operate even with usury
regulations limiting the interest rate to below the efficient market rate. See generally supra
text accompanying note 124.
136. A prohibition on emergency credit options will only hurt the most vulnerable
borrowers by increasing the rates at which they must borrow, because a prohibition on the
sale of a commodity creates a black market. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 64. Interest
rate caps below the efficient market rate would completely stop payday lending by legal
lenders. See id. at 108-109. However, when a certain commodity is completely unavailable
through legal channels because of regulation, the demand for that product still exists. See
generally id. If an individual has a need for credit, be it an emergency or otherwise, that
individual will either fulfill this need by obtaining the credit that is available or will suffer a
deprivation. See generally id. at 64. This leads to the formation of a black market that
offers the product at rates that are even higher than those that would be offered if the market
were unregulated. See id. Although this is undesirable, attempting to deny credit to all
consumers in this segment of the market hurts the consumers with legitimate credit needs
and it potentially does not help those who abuse credit since these individuals may also
resort to the use of the black market to fulfill their credit demand. See generally PRINCIPLES,
supra note 81, at 64.
137. When interest rates are above the efficient market rate, interest rate caps that are
below what is currently being charged but at or above the efficient rate will not prohibit
loans to that segment of the market entirely, but will only decrease the price of these loans.
See supra note 136.
138. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 48, 108-109, 143. This prediction
would have to take into account the costs of doing business, the overall risk of the subprime
market, the general return on capital in the credit market as a whole, and potentially other
factors as well. See generally id. Further, regulators would have to be able to adjust the
interest rate cap based upon fluctuations in the efficient market interest rate. See generally
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open market competition would extinguish rent automatically without
running the risk of closing the market.'39
B. Truth in Lending Act
The primary regulation regarding the disclosure of loan terms is
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 140  The purpose of TILA was to
provide consumer protection by facilitating an efficient market outcome
by encouraging price shopping.' 4' Sadly, TILA has failed to provide
real protection to payday borrowers. 42 TILA requires the disclosure of
interest and finance charges to borrowers before the consummation of
the loan; 143 Regulation Z, a regulation promulgated by the Federal
Reserve interpreting TILA, requires that these disclosures be made
"clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may
keep... before the consummation of the transaction."' 44 Theoretically,
if TILA required these disclosures to be made sufficiently far in
advance, it would ensure real price shopping in the payday lending
market. 
45
Courts, however, have not read the timing requirement strongly.
Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that the disclosure of
the terms need only be made moments before the consummation of the
agreement. 46  Also, in a ruling further limiting the effectiveness of
TILA, the Sixth Circuit, in Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc.,147 stated that
statutory damages are not available for a violation of the timing
requirement of Regulation Z. Thus, Baker requires proof of actual
damages, a prospect extremely chilling to those considering
representing a payday borrower. 48 These rulings eviscerate the power
139. See generally id. at 197.
140. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(2000).
141. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 881.
142. See id. at 901.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (2000).
144. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b) (2004).
145. See supra, text accompanying notes 57-71.
146. See Gavin v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 28 Fed. App. 220, 222 (4th Cir.
2002); Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F. 3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2002).
147. Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F. 3d 862 (6th Cir. 2003).
148. Id. at 869. Statutory damages accrue automatically when a sufficient violation of
TILA is found. Thomas A. Wilson, Comment, The Availability of Statutory Damages
Under TILA to Remedy the Sharp Practice of Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 339,
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of TILA to force payday lenders to allow meaningful price shopping in
the payday lending market.149 As Judge Posner has said, "[s]o much
for... [TILA] as a protection for borrowers."'' ° Although a stronger
TILA or binding usury laws would potentially fix many of the problems
with payday lending, 151 this note suggests a different possible solution
that would not require regulatory change: bank involvement in the
payday lending market.
V. THE SOLUTION: GREATER BANK INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBPRIME
CREDIT MARKET
This note suggests that the payday lending market would be
fixed if banks entered the market and competed with payday lenders.
So far many banks have chosen not to enter the payday lending market
and price compete with payday lenders 52 though this is starting to
change.153 There are several reasons for this. First, banks themselves
state that the payday lending market is not sufficiently profitable. 154 As
explained earlier, there are barriers to entry such as high servicing costs
that prevent banks from competing as payday lenders. 155  Second,
regulation such as state usury regulation may appear to be a barrier to
banks that wish to participate in this market for either logistical or
reputational reasons. This note suggests that if banks take advantage of
cost saving devices, they can price compete successfully with payday
lenders while also offering a superior product.
1 56
Banks can shift the payday lending market into a more perfect
345 (2003). On the other hand, actual damages require proof of actual harm as a result of
the disclosure violations, which may be more difficult to prove. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
150. Peterson, supra note 9, at 902 (citing Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343,
1346 (7th Cir. 1995)).
151. See Elwin Griffith, Searching for the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some Problems
in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 352 (2000) (arguing
that a stronger TILA would help consumers in general); Wilson, supra note 148, at 352
(suggesting that a stronger TILA would provide greater access to statutory damages and this
would help consumers).
152. See Jackson, supra note 111.
153. See infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text.
154. See Barr, supra note 9, at 182.
155. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 157-204 and accompanying text.
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equilibrium by instituting price competition,157 and banks can capture
the entire payday lender market share if they offer an alternative credit
instrument with better terms than a payday loan. 58  Banks could
institute price competition by advertising both the costs of their loans
and the fact that they are cheaper than the loans offered by payday
lenders. 159 Consumers might well be willing to travel longer distances
and deal with less extensive hours to take advantage of lower rates and
better terms offered by banks. 160 Banks following this proposal would
gain access to a larger customer base which allows the diversification of
risk and easier access to customers. Also, serving the subprime market
specifically should increase the likelihood of the bank earning a
favorable Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Rating.' 6' The
following subsection analyzes current and potential credit instruments
that could compete with payday loans.
A. Current and Possible Alternatives to Payday Loans
The State Employee Credit Union (SECU) salary advance loan
(SAL) exists explicitly to compete as a lower cost alternative to payday
loans. 162 This loan is available to any member of the SECU who has his
paycheck directly deposited at the SECU. 163  The SECU provides a
maximum ceiling of $500 for these loans and they are offered at an
APR of 11.75%.' 64 Further, the SECU offers free credit counseling for
users of any of their loans. 65  In addition, the SECU creates Salary
157. If consumers can price shop, this will help fix the market failure. See PRINCIPLES,
supra note 81, at 201.
158. See id. at 94. Even if consumers can price shop, payday lenders profit from the
structure of their loan and so providing alternatives will help facilitate the process of fixing
the objectionable qualities of payday loans by allowing substitution away from the payday
loans. See id.
159. See id. This kind of advertisement would help break the perception of many
borrowers that they could not get credit from a bank. See Barr, supra note 9, at 183.
160. See supra text accompanying note 112.
161. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1600 (2002). The Community Reinvestment Act
rates how well a bank has been serving the credit needs of the community and having a high
rating is important when banks want to merge or open new branches. See id. at 1574.
162. See State Employees Credit Union: Salary Advance, at http://www.ncsecu.org/
Loans/Personal/SALO.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) [hereinafter SAL Webpage].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Advance Cash Account (SACA) for each member that takes out a SAL,
and a small portion (5%) of each SAL goes into the SACA and is
pledged as collateral for the loan. 166 Since the SACA grows every time
a borrower takes out or renews an SAL, a borrower can use his SACA
to eventually pay off an outstanding SAL, guaranteeing that the cycle of
reliance on the SAL will end. 167
Phil Greer, SECU Senior Vice President of Loan
Administration, explains that the SAL is a feasible loan instrument for
the SECU. m68  Although exact statistics on these loans were not
available, Mr. Greer estimates that the SECU makes around a 3% net
retention 169 in earnings on these loans after taking into account losses
and operating costs. 170  Over 40,000 SECU members have used this
service, and there is an approximate default rate of around 2.8%.
17 1
Over the past four years this default rate has lead to a charge off of
around $800,000 though $120,000 has later been recovered.7 2  The
direct deposit requirement of the SAL decreases the default rate because
the loan is repaid immediately after the paycheck is deposited.
Nonetheless, default does occur because the individuals with the loan
can switch banks or lose their jobs while the loan is still outstanding.
173
Further, although no exact statistics were available, members' responses
to both the SAL and to the credit counseling option have been very
positive. 174 The SECU is not the only credit union to offer an
alternative credit instrument to the payday loan, and other credit unions
have had similarly positive experiences.
175
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Telephone Interview with Phil Greer, Senior Vice President of Loan
Administration, SECU (Nov. 24, 2004).
169. Net retention in earnings is analogous to profit but since the SECU is non-profit it
would be incorrect to label it as such. See generally id.
170. Telephone Interview with Phil Greer, Senior Vice President of Loan
Administration, SECU (Nov. 24, 2004).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See JERRY BUCKLAND ET AL., THE RISE OF FRINGE BANKING SERVICES IN WINNIPEG'S
NORTH END: CLIENT EXPERIENCES, FIRM LEGITIMACY, AND COMMUNITY BASED
ALTERNATIVES 98-102, 107-110. (2003), available at http://ius.uwinnipeg.ca/pdf/fringe.
banking.Chesya.pdf#xml=http://search.uwinnipeg.ca/cgi-
bin/texis/webinator/search/xml.txt?query=fringe+banking&pr=-ius&order-r&cq=&id=4 1 aa6
6967 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter WINNIPEG STUDY].
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Austin Bank of Chicago is also planning on offering an
instrument to compete with payday loans. 7 6 The instrument is a line of
credit. 77  "Would-be borrowers will apply for three-year loans of
$1,000 to $10,000. If approved, they will receive checks for drawing on
the loan. If they write checks, they will have to make monthly
payments of 3% of the principal and accrued interest until the balance is
paid."' 178 This kind of credit alternative has lower transaction costs than
a payday loan. 179 To qualify for this credit line the borrower would
have to hold an account with the bank. 180 Wells Fargo & Co. of San
Francisco has a Direct Deposit Advance program that "allows
customers with direct deposit accounts to borrow up to half of the
money directly deposited a week in advance." '181
Professor Michael Barr suggests that banks could also compete
with payday lenders by offering overdraft lines of credit. 182 He argues
that overdraft lines of credit could be offered at both lower cost and
lower risk because there is no need for face-to-face transactions and the
loan repayments could occur automatically. 83 Banks would have to
alter the period over which the loan is repaid though from the current
policy of around 30 days. 184 These overdraft lines of credit would have
to differ from the bounce protection offered by many banks if they are
to serve the credit needs of consumers both in terms of the cost of these
lines of credit and in terms of the qualifications required to qualify for
overdraft lines of credit. 85 For instance, banks would have to dispense
with the requirement of a good credit report to qualify for overdraft
lines of credit 186 to reach the borrowers targeted by the proposal and
would probably have to loosen other requirements as well.
176. See Jackson, supra note 111.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Barr, supra note 9, at 163.
183. Seeid. at 164.
184. See id.
185. See Owen B. Asplundh, Comment, Bounce Protection: Payday Lending in Sheep's
Clothing?, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 349 (2004).
186. See id.
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B. The Economic Feasibility of Offering Alternatives to Payday
Loans
Payday loans are perceived as unfeasible by banks probably
because of the high transaction costs in servicing and underwriting these
loans.18 7 Indeed, the Winnipeg Study, a feasibility analysis of lower
cost payday lending, came to the conclusion that the break even interest
rate for payday lenders is around 130%.188 This analysis is based on the
assumption that the lender's only business is to offer loans and that a
single staff person would make 190 loans in a year of value totaling
$40,000 and would do the labor involved in accounting for these
loans. 189 The break even calculation assumes loan loss rates of 3%
(which is closer to those of the SECU than to the lower loss rates of
payday lenders) 190 and it takes into account building maintenance costs
and rent.' 91 Banks would probably not be enthusiastic about offering
loans with APRs exceeding the 130%. Further, since a small loan can
cost as much to underwrite as a large loan, 19 2 the payday lending
business model is probably not a feasible option for banks in the current
market. 1
93
However, innovations in banking services can decrease the
transaction costs involved in making payday loans, allowing banks to
charge lower interest rates than the feasibility study suggests and giving
banks a significant advantage over payday lenders.1 94 First, banks have
greater access to capital at cheaper rates than payday lenders since
banks accept deposits. Second, lines of credit like that offered by
Austin Bank of Chicago' 95 or like those suggested by Professor Barr'
9 6
decrease the servicing costs of these loans since banks would not need
employees helping borrowers renew loans every two weeks as payday
187. See supra notes 114, 154-155 and accompanying text.
188. See WINNIPEG STUDY, supra note 175, at Appendix G(C).
189. Seeid.
190. Compare Barr, supra note 9, at 150, with Telephone Interview with Phil Greer,
Senior Vice President of Loan Administration, SECU (Nov. 24, 2004) (showing that SECU
losses were 2.8% while payday lender losses were between I and 1.3%).
191. See WINNIPEG STUDY, supra note 175, at Appendix G(C).
192. See Jackson, supra note 111.
193. See generally WINNIPEG STUDY, supra note 175, at 169.
194. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 176-180.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 182-186.
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lenders do with loan rollover. 197 Having a direct deposit requirement
like the SECU' 98 or Wells Fargo & Co. of San Francisco'99 would also
decrease servicing costs by allowing direct deduction of loan payments
while also decreasing the likelihood of default.200 Indeed, assuming that
a bank was offering overdraft protection, the APR of 130% used by the
Winnipeg Study would yield a net return on capital of close to 100%.201
Although it might appear that payday lenders have an economic
advantage over banks in abusive collection practices,2 2 this advantage
is not significant competitively. While the exact economic value of this
advantage is not entirely clear,20 3 this apparent economic advantage is
not a competitive advantage for payday lenders because of the working
of the market. Abusive collection practices allow the payday lender to
save money on collections, but this only works if consumers know
about the practices (e.g. consumers can only be encouraged to default
less frequently by bad check laws if payday lenders actually make
threats). When banks do not make such threats, the abusive collection
practices become just another contract term that is assigned an
economic value by the market, and this extinguishes the payday lenders'
advantage.2°
C. The Regulatory Feasibility of Bank Involvement
Banks face two potential regulatory hurdles in offering
alternatives to payday loans: usury laws and safety and soundness
concerns. Even though banks may be able to feasibly offer alternatives
197. See supra note 114.
198. See supra text accompanying note 163.
199. See supra text accompanying note 181.
200. See supra note 114.
201. See WINNIPEG STUDY, supra note 175, at Appendix G(C). This is based on the
assumption that the employee would be able to work significantly fewer hours and that a
separate bank branch would not be necessary to offer these loans (which yields a savings of
almost $35,000 to be measured against the loan capital of $40,000). See id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
203. It should be noted that payday lenders report a default rate of between 1 and 1.3%.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Comparatively, the SECU reports a default rate
of approximately 2.8% as a result of their direct deposit requirement. Telephone Interview
with Phil Greer, Senior Vice President of Loan Administration, SECU (Nov. 24, 2004). The
Winnipeg study assumes an even greater default rate in its calculations. See WINNIPEG
STUDY, supra note 175, at Appendix G(C).
204. See Craswell, supra note 78, at 88.
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to payday loans, banks still might have to circumvent usury laws in
some states with more stringent usury limits (such as North Carolina
with its 16% limit on small loans).2 °5 The most obvious way to do this
is for the bank to import interest rates under federal law from a bank
located in a state with favorable usury laws.2 °6 This could be done by
having the in-state bank act as an agent of an out-of-state bank owned
by the same holding company as is done with credit card banks.
20 7 This
is not charter renting because the loans would be held by an out of state
affiliated bank, and not subsequently transferred to an entity that could
not make the loan independently.20 8
Banks making subprime loans are subject to various regulatory
guidelines to ensure that they continue to operate in a safe and sound
manner.20 9 The federal bank regulators have divided banks making
subprime loans into two groups.2 0  Those banks whose subprime
lending programs account for less than 25% of tier one regulatory
capital 2l' are subject to the Interagency Guidance for Subprime Lending
Programs (IGSLP) (March 1, 1999).212 Those banks with subprime
lending programs greater than or equal to 25% of tier one regulatory
capital are, in addition, subject to the Expanded Guidance for Subprime
Lending Programs (Expanded IGSLP).213
The IGSLP "establishes the agencies' expectations for proper
business planning, risk management, and controls. 214 Banks that do
not properly account for risk under these guidelines are lending in an
unsafe and unsound manner.215 The IGSLP notes that effective credit
risk evaluations and collection practices may differ from those that
could be used with prime borrowers, and thus banks need to move
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (2004).
206. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2002) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1831 d (2002) (state banks).
207. See Schiltz, supra note 125, at 578.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 124-127.
209. See infra notes 210-223 and accompanying text.
210. See OCC, FIL. 2001-6, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2
(2001).
211. Tier One Regulatory Capital is stockholder equity and retained earnings. See
BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 53, at 586.
212. See OCC, 2001-6, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2
(2001).
213. See id.
214. OCC, FIL. 99-10, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 1
(1999).
215. See id. at 3.
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carefully into the subprime credit market.21 6 The IGSLP essentially
requires banks to have a more detailed set of internal evaluations of
collection practices, credit risks, and underwriting requirements than
they would with prime loans.21 7 Also, if institutions intend to securitize
subprime portfolios, due to the volatility of the market, they are required
to develop a contingency plan to deal with the event that they will not
be able to sell the subprime loans.218
Pursuant to the Expanded IGSLP, if examiners determine that
risk management provisions are deficient, the examiners may require
that the bank cease to engage in subprime lending.219 The Expanded
IGSLP also details the appropriate procedures for banks to deal with
expected losses from subprime loans. 220  Lenders are required to
document their opinion on the capital necessary to offset the added risk
of subprime loans and examiners are to evaluate these opinions on a
case by case basis.221 In general, the Expanded IGSLP places greater
burdens upon banks to prove that they are lending in a safe and sound
manner. 222  These two sets of guidelines show that banks are not
prohibited from engaging in subprime lending for safety and soundness
reasons, and must take sufficient steps to deal with the risks and costs
associated with these programs. Banks must also determine the level of
regulation that they are willing to accept in establishing the appropriate
size for their subprime lending programs.223
D. Reputational Feasibility of Bank Involvement
There are two primary reputational concerns raised by bank
entry into this market. First, there may be a reputational risk arising if
banks were forced to circumvent state usury laws. However, the fact
that banks routinely circumvent these laws with their credit card
216. See id. at 4-5.
217. See id. at 5-6.
218. See id. at 7-8.
219. See OCC, FIL. 2001-6, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 3(2001).
220. See id. at 3-5.
221. See id. at 5.
222. See id. at 3-11.
223. See supra notes 209-222 and accompanying text.
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programs should help assuage this concern.2 4 Second, the reputational
risk associated with debt collection practices is a concern for banks.
The threat of criminal prosecution under bad check laws, although
effective, is probably something that banks would want to avoid for
reasons of reputation.225 The Interagency Guidelines for Subprime
Lending acknowledge that different collection practices may be
necessary for subprime loans. 6 However, the FDIC guidelines for
Payday Lending note that illegal collection practices should hurt a
bank's CRA rating.227 Thus, banks will have to develop a plan for how
to appropriately deal with collection practices in a safe and fair manner
under this proposal to avoid reputational risks. The use of a direct
deposit requirement could help decrease debt collection reputation risk
by automating debt collection to a greater degree.
VI. CONCLUSION
Greater bank involvement in the payday lending market has a
number of policy advantages. First, consumers would have better
access to more affordable credit than is currently available.228  The
better terms and prices afforded by efficient competition would enable
individuals to obtain credit better tailored to their specific situations.229
Second, bank involvement would allow many subprime borrowers to
develop positive credit histories.23° Payday lenders do not report their
loans to credit reporting agencies. 231 Thus, borrowers who use payday
loans never develop positive credit histories.232 Bank involvement
could very easily remedy this problem and allow many subprime
borrowers to cease to be subprime credit risks.23 3 The SECU already
224. See Schiltz, supra note 125, at 578.
225. See FDIC, Guidelines for Payday Lending, available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/safety/payday/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
226. OCC, FIL. 99-10, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 5-6
(1999).
227. See FDIC, Guidelines for Payday Lending, at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
safety/payday/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2004); see also supra note 161.
228. See supra text accompanying note 77.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 157-186.
230. See Barr, supra note 9, at 158.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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reports salary advance loans to credit reporting services so that its users
can develop positive credit histories.234
Banks may have a unique opportunity to enter and reform a
market and at the same time make a profit. This opportunity is an
illustration of self interest resulting in collective benefit. Should banks
continue to determine that there is profit to be made in this market and
enter this market in greater numbers, then they will be able do
something that federal and state legislatures, federal and state agencies,
and even consumer groups have been largely unable to accomplish: stop
the abusive lending practices of payday lenders.
MICHAEL BERTICS
234. Telephone Interview with Phil Greer, Senior Vice President of Loan
Administration, SECU (Nov. 24, 2004).
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